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"In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. '"'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Constitution does not guarantee a
fundamental right to education, all U.S. states recognize a right to
primary and secondary education in state constitutions or confer that
right by statute.' As the United States Supreme Court has observed,"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."'  Both compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education demonstrate the recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society.4 "Today, [educa-
tion] is a principal instrument in awakening [a] child to cultural val-
ues, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
J.D., Seattle University School of Law, 2003; B.A., University of Michigan, 1998.
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 (1991).
3. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. The U.S. Supreme Court has also observed that education "pro-
vides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives" and "has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982).
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
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him to adjust normally to his environment."5 The failure of some cor-
rectional facilities to provide juvenile6 inmates an adequate education,
including special education, deprives juveniles of a critical resource
that can assist them in becoming productive members of society upon
release.
Approximately 125,000 young people are now in custody in pub-
lic and private correctional facilities in the United States.8 "The ma-
jority of youth enter correctional facilities with a broad range of in-
tense educational, mental health, medical, and social needs."9 A recent
study has estimated that 35.6% of juvenile offenders have learning dis-
abilities and an additional 12.6% have mental retardation.'" Another
twenty-two percent of those incarcerated have significant mental
health problems. 1 "Large numbers of incarcerated juveniles are mar-
ginally literate or illiterate and have experienced school failure and re-
tention. ' 12 These youths are also disproportionately male, African-
American, poor, and have significant learning and/or emotional prob-
lems that entitle them to special education and related services."
While illiteracy and poor academic performance are not direct causes
of delinquency, studies demonstrate a strong link between marginal
5. Id.
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 72.05.020(3) (2003) defines "juvenile" as "a person under the age
of twenty-one who has been sentenced to a term of confinement under the supervision of the de-
partment of corrections under RCW § 13.40.185." WASH. REV. CODE § 13.80.020(1) (2003)
also defines "Court-involved youth" as
those youth under the age of twenty-one who, within the past twenty-four months
(a) have served a court-imposed sentence; (b) are or have been on probation or parole;
or (c) are involved in a legal proceeding in which the youth may be found to have
committed a criminal or juvenile offense ....
Id.
7. Unfortunately, Washington State's incarcerated juveniles (namely those between the
ages of 18 and 21) are among many in the United States who do not receive the educational ser-
vices to which they are entitled.
8. See National Center on Education, Disability and Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Correctional
Education Programs, at http://www.edjj.org/education.html (last modified Jan. 25, 2002) [here-
inafter EDJJ Report].
9. Id.
10. See P. Casey and I. Keilitz, Estimating the Prevalence of Learning Disabled and Mentally
Retarded Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, in UNDERSTANDING TROUBLED AND
TROUBLING YOUTH 82, 96 (P. Leone ed., 1990).
11. See R.K. Otto et al., Prevalence of Mental Disorders Among Youth in the Juvenile Justice
System, in RESPONDING TO THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM (J.J. Cocozza ed., 1992).
12. EDJJ Report, supra note 8.
13. Donna Murphy, The Prevalence of Handicapping Conditions Among Juvenile Delinquents,
REMEDIAL AND SPECIAL EDUCATION, May/June 1986, at 7.
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literacy skills and the likelihood of becoming involved in the juvenile
justice system.14
The negative consequences of marginal literacy extend well be-
yond the greatly heightened risk for incarceration among adolescents.'"
The rate of poverty among those in the labor force without a
high school diploma is approximately three times that of high
school graduates. Eighteen to twenty-three year olds least profi-
cient in the basic skills of reading and mathematics are more
likely to be unemployed, living in poverty, and not enrolled in
any type of schooling.' 6
Educating juveniles in correctional institutions serves as an effec-
tive method in preventing crime and reducing the rate of recidivism.
According to the Washington Department of Corrections ("DOC"),
in 1998, eighty-six percent of the 1,027 youth incarcerated in Wash-
ington's adult prisons served sentences of ten years or less. 17 National
studies have estimated a recidivism rate among prisoners as high as
seventy percent.'8 A recent U.S. Department of Education study,
however, has shown that inmates who receive schooling through voca-
tional training or classes at the high school or college level are far less
likely to return to prison within three years of their release.' 9 Inmates
who receive two years of post-high school education while in prison
have a re-arrest rate of ten percent compared to the national rate of
sixty percent. 20 Thus, educating juvenile inmates during incarceration
can help them to redirect their lives and effectively reduce juvenile de-
linquency and recidivism.
Despite compelling evidence that educating incarcerated youths
reduces recidivism while increasing post-release success in employ-
ment and other life endeavors, the lack of attention given to educa-
tional rights of delinquent youth is part of a disturbing national trend
in providing incarcerated youth with minimal or no educational ser-
14. Id.; In 1994, the National Center for Education Statistics reported that eighty-two per-
cent of prisoners nationwide were high school dropouts. Katsiyannis, "Academic Remedia-
tion/Achievement and other Factors Related to Recidivism Rates Among Delinquent Youths,
Behavioral Disorders, 24(2), 93-101, February 1999, p. 99, citing U.S. Department of Education,
Mini-digest of education statistics, 1994, Washington D.C. (1994).
15. EDJJ Report, supra note 8.
16. Id.
17. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201, 208, 5 P.3d 691, 695 (2000).
18. William R. Toiler, Education-An Important Part of the Puzzle for Inmates, SHERIFF,
Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 11.
19. Tamar Lewin, Inmate Education is Found to Lower Risk of New Arrest, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2001, at A18.
20. Alexandria Marks, One Inmate's Push to Restore Education Fund for Prisoners,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 20, 1997, at 2.
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vices. In many states around the country, the education offered to de-
linquent and incarcerated youths is seriously deficient. Applicable
correctional standards generally fail to protect the rights of children in
detention to receive an adequate education. In Pennsylvania, an ex-
pelled student under the age of seventeen has a right to only minimal
education (about five hours per week, versus the usual 27.5 hours),
and an expelled student seventeen or older is not entitled to education
at all. 21 In Maryland, the only standards with which all jails and de-
tention facilities in the state are required to comply make no provision
for inmate education.22 Sadly, the State of Washington has been, and
continues to be, a part of this trend in light of the recent Washington
Supreme Court decision, Tunstall v. Bergeson.23
The state high court in Tunstall effectively ruled incarcerated in-
dividuals over age eighteen do not have a statutory or constitutionally
protected right to basic education.24 Furthermore, the Court held the
State was not required to provide special education to inmates between
eighteen and twenty-two years of age.2S The Court's failure to provide
education to all school-aged youth in Washington is not only costly to
our society, but also violates the most important right guaranteed by
the Washington Constitution-the right to an education provided
through a uniform public school system under Article IX.26
Tunstall v. Bergeson was wrongly decided because the Basic Edu-
cation Act and Article IX both require state-funded education for in-
carcerated youths up to age twenty-one, and the Education Programs
for Juvenile Inmates Act is unconstitutional as it violates Equal Pro-
tection. This Note discusses the impact of Tunstall v. Bergeson, and
the educational rights of incarcerated youth, specifically those between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, who are denied their statutory
and constitutional right to basic and special education while confined
in Washington State's correctional facilities. The Note reviews the
relevant state and federal laws and constitutional provisions that enti-
21. Brian B. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 230 F.3d 582 (3d. Cir.
2000) (citing 22 Pa. Code §12.6 (e)).
22. MICHAEL BOCHENEK, No MINOR MATTER CHILDREN IN MARYLAND'S JAILS
(1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/Maryland-08.htm (last visited
May 3, 2003).
23. 141 Wash. 2d 201, 5 P.3d 691 (2000).
24. Id.; Of the more than 1,000 youth in adult prisons in Washington in 1998, only about
100-those under age eighteen-were being provided some basic and special education programs
mandated by the Washington Constitution and Basic Education Act, WASH. REV. CODE §
28A.150 (2003).
25. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 207, 5 P.3d at 694-695.
26. Seattle School Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 513, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
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tle incarcerated juveniles to educational services they are wrongfully
denied as a result of the Tunstall decision.
The analysis begins in Section II with a general overview and
summary of Tunstall v. Bergeson. Section III presents a brief legisla-
tive background of the statute at issue in Tunstall, Education Pro-
grams for Juvenile Inmates, RCW section 28A.193. Section IV dis-
cusses Tunstall's misinterpretation of these statutory provisions,
demonstrating the Education Programs for Juvenile Inmates' disre-
gard of the paramount duty to provide education to youth under
twenty-one pursuant to the Basic Education Act and violation of the
Washington Constitution, as discussed in Section V. Next, Section VI
argues that because the right to education is a fundamental right under
state law, the Education Programs for Juvenile Inmates statute violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Washington Constitution. Finally,
Section VII examines the juvenile inmates' right to special education,
both under the state Special Education Act, and the federal Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act.
II. SUMMARY OF TUNsTALL v. BERGESON
In 1998, the Washington State Legislature passed the Engrossed
Substitute Senate Bill ("ESSB") 6600, providing for the education of
inmates under the age of eighteen who are incarcerated in adult pris-
ons.27 That year, a class of inmates under age twenty-one and inmates
with disabilities brought suit against the State Superintendent of Pub-
lic Instruction, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections
("DOC"), and several school districts in the state, challenging ESSB
6600, now codified as RCW chapter 28A.193.28 RCW chapter
28A. 193 provides for the education of juveniles incarcerated in adult
prisons; however, it limits the availability of basic education to in-
mates under the age of eighteen and fails to provide for special educa-
tional opportunities. 29 The inmates claimed the newly enacted statute
violated Article IX of the Washington Constitution, the Basic Educa-
tion Act, the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Due Process and Equal
Protection under the Washington Constitution and the United States
Constitution.30
27. 1998 Wash. Laws 244 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.193).
28. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 208, 5 P.3d at 695.
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.193.030(3)-(4) (2003).
30. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 208-209, 5 P.3d at 695-696. The class of plaintiffs that cer-
tified by the court included: All individuals who are now, or who will in the future be, commit-
ted to the custody of the Washington Department of Corrections, who are allegedly denied ac-
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The trial court granted summary judgment for the inmates on
their state constitutional claims, ruling that the State had a paramount
duty under Article IX of the Washington Constitution and the Basic
Education Act to provide basic education to incarcerated juveniles un-
der twenty-one, and to provide special education to disabled, incarcer-
ated youth under twenty-two.31 The trial court also ruled RCW chap-
ter 28A.193 unconstitutional for not providing for special education
for disabled juvenile inmates and for impermissibly limiting basic
education to incarcerated youths under the age of eighteen.32 The trial
court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' federal claims.33
On appeal, the State, as appellants and cross-respondents, chal-
lenged the trial court rulings regarding the inmates' state law claims.34
The inmates, as respondents and cross-appellants, challenged the trial
court's dismissal of their federal claims.3" On direct review of the trial
court's summary judgment rulings, the high court reversed, holding
although the statutory right to public education for non-incarcerated
persons in Washington extends to persons under age twenty-one, Ar-
ticle IX of the Washington Constitution, guaranteeing a public educa-
tion to "all children," applies only to persons under age eighteen.36
Moreover, the court held RCW chapter 28A.193 satisfied Article IX
by providing educational programs designed to address the particular
educational and rehabilitative needs of children incarcerated in adult
prisons.37 The court found state educational programs for incarcerated
youths did not violate equal protection because the programs were ra-
tionally related to the state objective of meeting the inmates' unique
educational needs.38 The court also held that the rational basis test,
rather than strict scrutiny, applied because RCW chapter 28A. 193 did
not infringe upon a fundamental right, and the inmates' incarceration
and juvenile status did not place them in a suspect class.39
The state high court declined to address the claim that the
Washington Constitution guarantees special education to inmates who
are under twenty-two and disabled.4" The court concluded that the
cess to basic or special education during that custody, under the age of twenty-one, or disabled
and under the age of twenty-two. Id. at 208, 5 P.3d at 695.





36. Id. at 233, 5 P.3d at 708.
37. Id. at 223, 5 P.3d at 702.
38. Id. at 227, 5 P.3d at 705.
39. Id. at 226, 5 P.3d at 704
40. Id .at 207, 5 P.3d at 695.
1022 [Vol. 26:1017
The Debilitating Effects of Tunstall v. Bergeson
record and plaintiffs' briefings were not sufficiently developed to de-
cide the issue.4' Given the importance and complexity of the issue, the
court decided to reserve the matter for future determination "in a case
where the record and briefing are adequately developed. 4 2 One jus-
tice dissented maintaining that RCW chapter 28A.193 threatens a
fundamental right to education by allowing a separate and unequal
system and failing to provide uniform, general, and ample education
for all children.43 Furthermore, he argued that all children should
have the same constitutional right to a high school education, regard-
less of their criminal past.44
III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITIES FOR JUVENILE INMATES
Tunstall v. Bergeson is currently the leading Washington case ad-
dressing an incarcerated juvenile's right to a public education. The
court's ruling in Tunstall has helped define the right, but did little to
effectively address the problem of education for juvenile offenders.
Historically, neither the State of Washington nor any of its school dis-
tricts have provided any educational opportunities leading to a high
school diploma for inmates in a DOC facility, though the State has
provided some opportunities to inmates through community colleges
for the acquisition of a GED.4  In addition, no educational programs
for persons with disabilities have been provided within these set-
tings. 6
In enacting "Education Programs for Juvenile Inmates,"47 the
Legislature sought to address this issue by conferring a right to educa-
tion upon incarcerated juveniles; however, in doing so, it erroneously
ignored the Basic Education Act's requirement that all Washington
children up to twenty-one years of age have access to educational op-
portunities. The following subsections provide an overview of these
statutory provisions.
A. Washington's Basic Education Act
All children residing within the State's borders have a right to be
amply provided with an education.4' The right is constitutionally
41. Id.
42. Id.




47. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.193
48. WASH. CONST. art. IX
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paramount, and the state must fulfill the obligation through "a general
and uniform system of public schools."49 The purpose of the Basic
Education Act is to fulfill the State's paramount constitutional duty to
provide an education to "all children" residing in Washington, and to
do so by means of the "general and uniform system of public schools"
also required by the Washington Constitution.0 Accordingly, the Ba-
sic Education Act requires that "[e]ach school district's kindergarten
through twelfth grade basic educational program shall be accessible to
all students who are five years of age... and less than twenty-one years
of age . . . ."s The goals of the Act are explicitly set forth in the stat-
ute:
The goal of the Basic Education Act ... shall be to provide stu-
dents with the opportunity to become responsible citizens, to
contribute to their own economic well-being, and to that of their
families and communities, and to enjoy productive and satisfy-
ing lives. To these ends, the goals of each school district, with
the involvement of parents and community members, shall be to
provide opportunities for all students to develop the knowledge
and skills essential to:
(1) Read with comprehension, write with skill, and communicate
effectively and responsibly in a variety of ways and settings;
(2) Know and apply the core concepts and principles of mathe-
matics; social, physical and life sciences; civics and history; ge-
ography; arts; and health and fitness;
(3) Think analytically, logically, creatively, and to integrate ex-
perience and knowledge to form reasoned judgments and solve
problems; and
(4) Understand the importance of work and how performance,
effort, and decisions directly affect future career and educational
52opportunities.
The Basic Education Act, like the constitutional provisions it was
enacted to implement, establishes an education system available to all
49. WASH. CONST. art. IX § 3; Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 513, 585
P.2d 71,91 (1978).
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.200 (2003); Tommy P. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
97 Wn.2d 385, 645 P.2d 697 (1982).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.220(3) (2003) (emphasis added).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.210(2003).
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students ages five through twenty-one, and excludes none.53 There-
fore the Basic Education Act confers the right upon all students ages
five through twenty-one to have access to educational opportunities
regardless of whether they are incarcerated.
B. Education Programs for Juvenile Inmates Legislation
In March 1998, the Washington Legislature attempted to ad-
dress the problem of the lack of education for juvenile inmates by
passing the Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill ("ESSB") 6600, now
codified as RCW chapter 28A.193, titled "Education Programs for
Juvenile Inmates." The legislation provided some DOC inmates un-
der the age of eighteen the opportunity to earn a high school diploma.
However, no provision was made for the education of incarcerated
youth between ages eighteen and twenty-two, except that youths who
had begun a high school program during incarceration before turning
eighteen could, under some circumstances, remain in the program af-
ter their eighteenth birthday. 4
Moreover, while the Legislature intended the act to satisfy any
constitutional duty to provide education services to juveniles in adult
correctional facilities, it failed to address any constitutional duty to
provide special education." Furthermore, despite the Legislature's
recognition of the State's obligation to improve programs and to pro-
vide an education consistent with the Basic Education Act,56 the re-
sulting statute limited the duty of a juvenile educator to provide edu-
cation programs for inmates under the age of eighteen. 7 The relevant
portion of the statute reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided for by contract under RCW
28A.193.060, the duties and authority of a school district,
educational service district, institution of higher education, or
private contractor to provide for education programs under this
53. Similarly, the Act repeatedly asserts that all children with disabilities are entitled to
special education services.
54. Eighteen-year olds who have already participated in the program "may continue in the
program with permission of the department of corrections and the education provider." WASH.
REV. CODE § 28A.193.030(4) (2003). But eighteen-year olds, who are not already in the pro-
gram, are excluded, as are all nineteen- and twenty-year olds. The percentage of school-aged
youth covered is thus very small. At the time of the lawsuit, there were approximately 100 youth
under the age of eighteen in prison and more than 1,000 under the age of twenty-one.
55. Washington Legislature House Bill Report, ESSB 6600, (1998) available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/1997-98/senate/6600-6624/6 6 0 0 -shbr_030998.txt.
"This bill is a start but does not address the issues of juveniles in jails or issues regarding special
education." Id.
56. Id.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.193.030(3) (2003).
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vate contractor to provide for education programs under this
chapter are limited to the following:
(3) Conducting education programs for inmates under the age of
eighteen in accordance with program standards established by
the superintendent of public instruction."'
This provision is manifestly inconsistent with the Basic Educa-
tion Act's requirement that educational programs be accessible to all
students less than twenty-one years of age.59
IV. TUNSTALL'S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE BASIC EDUCATION
ACT AND THE EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR JUVENILE INMATES
LEGISLATION
Despite the clear language of the statute, the Tunstall court found
that the Basic Education Act does not specifically address the educa-
tional needs of youths incarcerated in DOC facilities and, thus, did
not apply to the inmate class.6" The court concluded RCW chapter
28A.193 was enacted with the intent "to provide for the operation of
education programs for DOC inmates."6  Given the apparent con-
flicts between the statutes, the court relied on principles of statutory
construction 62 to determine whether the Basic Education Act applied
to the inmate class, finding that RCW chapter 28A. 193 was the more
recent and far more specific statute regarding inmate education and
thus giving it preference.63
The court's ruling that the Basic Education Act does not apply to
incarcerated youth is foreclosed by the statute's plain language and the
court's decision in Tommy P. v. Board of County Commissioners.64 The
court in Tommy P. concluded that the Basic Education Act extended
to all children incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities.65 Tommy P.
makes clear that children do not lose their right to education required
by the Washington Constitution and implemented by the Basic Edu-
cation Act simply because they are incarcerated.66 Rather, the court
58. Id.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.220(3) (2003).
60. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d 201 at 212, 5 P.3d at 697.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.193.005 (2003).
62. See In re Estate of Little, 106 Wash. 2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950, 958 (1986).
63. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 211, 5 P.3d at 697.
64. 97 Wash. 2d 385, 391-93, 645 P.2d 697 (1982).
65. Id. at 391, 645 P.2d at 700 (stating that the Act "provides for the education of every
child in this state"); id. at 392, 645 P.2d at 701 (stating that the Act "recognizes the critical im-
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recognized that a proper education is one of the most urgent needs of
many juvenile offenders and that there are compelling reasons for re-
sponding to such needs.67
Notwithstanding the court's acknowledgment of the importance
of education for these youth, the Tunstall court chose to distinguish
Tommy P. by noting that the plaintiffs in that case involved juvenile
offenders detained in juvenile detention facilities, not youths who had
been incarcerated in adult correctional facilities.68 This distinction,
however, is questionable. Regardless of where a child may be con-
fined, the court nonetheless deprives him or her of a constitutional
right to an education simply because that child has committed a crime.
Although providing an education to detained or incarcerated ju-
veniles may not be essential to achieve the policy goals of punishment
and accountability, it does further the goal of rehabilitation, one of the
primary principles underlying the Juvenile Justice Act ("JJA") of
1977.69 The court has interpreted this act as placing an emphasis on
the interest, welfare, and rehabilitation of the child when committed to
an institution. 71 In fulfillment of this policy, an educational program
suited to the needs of the juvenile offender is consistent with the pur-
pose of providing the "necessary treatment" under the Act.71 The
Tommy P. court recognized that the provision of education in deten-
tion is a particularly effective response to a critical need of juvenile of-
fenders and an important step in achieving rehabilitation. 72 The provi-
sion of education, therefore, may reasonably be considered an aspect
of the "treatment" that offenders are required to be provided.73
One teacher has amply expressed the special, educational needs
of juvenile offenders while being held in detention facilities:
For many youngsters it means the difference between whether or
not they will go on and get a GED certificate and become self-
sufficient adults.., or whether they're going to be delinquents
and eventually be in jail or prison ....
It also gives them a feeling of achievement, of success. Most of
them have never had that feeling, that I can succeed or do some-
thing. They get so tickled when they get a good score on a paper
or when they pass a test just as though it is the first time in their
67. Id.
68. TunstaUl, 141 Wash. 2d at 214, 5 P.3d at 698.
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40; see also In re Personal Restraint of Tapley, 72 Wash. App.
440, 445, 865 P.2d 12, 15 (1994).
70. See State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 657, 591 P.2d 772 (1978).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2)() (2003).
72. Tommy P., 97 Wash. 2d at 397-398, 645 P.2d at 703-704.
73. Id.
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life it has happened to them, and that feeling of achievement is
something that we all need desperately, but these children [need
it] more than anybody else because it is something that they
have missed out on so many times in the past.74
The clear purpose and policy behind the Basic Education Act is
consistent with the educational needs of juvenile offenders, whether
they are detained in the State's juvenile detention centers or in adult
correction facilities. The Tunstall court's ruling that the Basic Educa-
tion Act does not apply to incarcerated youths ignores the constitu-
tional rights of these individuals and fails to further the policy of reha-
bilitating and equipping these youths with the skills and education to
become responsible citizens. By giving preference to and upholding
RCW chapter 28A.193, the court essentially permitted the denial of
an education that would necessarily lead to the attainment of a high
school diploma, as required by the Basic Education Act.
The enactment of RCW chapter 28A.193, Education Programs
for Juvenile Inmates, effectively removes incarcerated juveniles from
the public school system and sets a new, lower standard of educational
compliance for the public entities responsible for ensuring that school-
aged juveniles in adult prison are provided an education. Because the
statute creates an inferior education system exclusively for juvenile
inmates in prisons, its implementation violates the mandate in the
Washington State Constitution to make ample provision for the edu-
cation of all children.
Furthermore, the court's holding in Tunstall will deprive many
juveniles of constitutionally entitled educational services because the
court specifically excluded eighteen- to twenty-one-year olds from
educational services under RCW chapter 28A.193,"s even though the
same group is entitled to public educational services under the Basic
Education Act. Thus, RCW chapter 28A.193 impinges on the right
of a juvenile inmate to receive basic education by not providing for
educational opportunities for those between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one.
The answer to why the Legislature chose to deny these juveniles
their right to education is simple; the State Legislature has not ade-
quately funded high school education programs for all youth under the
age of twenty-one in prison, nor has the Department of Corrections or
the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction ("OSPI") made
74. Tommy P., 97 Wash. 2d at 397, 645 P.2d at 703.
75. Providers under WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.193 are not bound by statutorily defined
education standards governing for example, curriculum requirements, minimum hours of in-
struction, and mandatory teacher ratios.
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prison education funding a priority. In effect, the strategy of limiting
the age at which an individual may be educated while in prison is sim-
ply a means of cutting prison costs, purporting to relieve a tax burden
on the public. What the Legislature has failed to recognize, however,
is that educating prisoners is cost-effective. Prisoners who are in-
volved in educational programs require less supervision and are less
prone to violence. The effect is not only a reduction in recidivism, but
also a reduction in prison staff and housing costs.
Furthermore, educating prisoners has long-term societal benefits.
Educated individuals are more likely to obtain work, to keep a job, and
to become tax-paying contributors to the economy instead of a drain
on other taxpayers' dollars. Thus, a quality education in prison is not
only an effective form of crime prevention, it is fiscally sound as well.
While the Legislature aims to cut prison costs by limiting the
availability of educational services, the inmates ultimately bear the ex-
pense; the denial of their absolute right to education under the Wash-
ington Constitution and, consequently, the opportunity to prepare
themselves to assume constructive roles in society.
V. WASHINGTON'S PARAMOUNT DUTY TO PROVIDE EDUCATION
FOR ALL CHILDREN
The right of all children in Washington to an education is set
forth in unmistakably clear language in the State Constitution:
It is the paramount duty of the State to make ample provision
for the education of all children residing within its borders with-
out distinction or preference on account of race, color, cast or
sex. 76
The legislature shall provide a general uniform system of public
schools. The public school system shall include common
schools and such high schools, normal schools and technical
schools as may hereafter be established. But the entire revenue
derived from the Common School Fund and the State tax for
common schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of
the common schools.77
These constitutional provisions were analyzed extensively in Se-
attle School District v. State,7" in which the Washington Supreme
Court recognized that the duties these provisions impose are unique-
whether measured against the background of other duties imposed by
76. WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
77. WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 2 (emphasis added).
78. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
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the Washington Constitution, or against the background of the educa-
tion provisions in other states:
By imposing upon the State a paramount duty to make ample
provision for the education of all children residing within the
State's borders, the Constitution has created a "duty" that is su-
preme, preeminent and dominant. Flowing from this constitu-
tionally imposed "duty" is its jural correlative, a correspondent"right" permitting control of another's conduct. Therefore, all
children residing within the borders of the State possess a''right" arising from the constitutionally imposed "duty" of the
State, to have the State make ample provision for their educa-
tion. Further, since the "duty" is characterized as paramount the
correlative "right" has equal stature.79
Neither the governing constitutional provision nor the landmark
Seattle School District case recognize any exception to the mandate that"all" children be provided a basic education. Indeed, the Seattle
School District court struck down a statutory scheme that permitted
children to be treated differently from one another in terms of their ac-
cess to basic education services. The petitioners in Seattle School Dis-
trict complained that the State did not allocate sufficient revenue to
school districts to enable the districts to comply with their statutory
and regulatory obligations. In order to obtain additional revenue, the
districts were required to resort to special excess levy elections. A dis-
trict that experienced a levy failure could end up with widely different
means for providing basic education than a district with better access
to funds." The Seattle School District court affirmed the superior
court's holding that the State had violated both its "paramount duty"
to provide education, and the constitutional uniformity clause.8' The
court's holding made clear that the constitutional requirement that the
State provide a basic education to "all children... without distinction
or preference" is a prohibition of all distinctions and preferences, not
just the illustrative distinctions set forth in Article IX.82
While the Seattle School District litigation was pending on ap-
peal, the Washington Legislature was taking steps to provide for the"'general and uniform system of public schools" required by the
Washington Constitution and the Supreme Court. This legislation
79. Id. at 511-512, 585 P.2d at 91 (emphasis in original).
80. Id. at 525-526, 585 P.2d at 97-99 (stating that "[T]he levy system's instability is dem-
onstrated by the special excess levy's dependence upon the assessed valuation of taxable real
property within a district.").
81. Id. at 485, 585 P.2d at 77-78.
82. Id. at 546-47, 585 P.2d at 109 (stating that "[T]he provision makes clear that this edu-
cation must be provided 'without distinction or preference' among the State's children.").
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took the form of the Basic Education Act (discussed earlier in Section
111).83 The public school system created by, and defined in, the Basic
Education Act plainly envisions that school districts are to be the pro-
vider of public education services: "The basic reason school districts
exist is for the education of children through development and main-
tenance of schools and associated education programs. ,84
The Tunstall court construed Article IX, section 2 as establishing
a fundamental right to the creation of a "common school system. '"85
The court reasoned that individuals incarcerated in DOC facilities are
by definition outside of the common school system, and are therefore
not covered under the Basic Education Act.86 However, the court
failed to recognize that all children possess a right "to be amply pro-
vided with an education," and the State's constitutional duty is not
merely to provide for a general and uniform, "common" school sys-
tem. Rather, the State's duty is to make "ample provision" for the
education of all children residing within its borders. This duty is
separate and distinct from the duty to provide for a uniform common
school scheme found in Article IX, section 2. The Washington Su-
preme Court noted this distinction in Seattle School District: "We also
disagree... that the framers only intended that a general and uniform
school system be provided. ,87 Had this been the intent of the framers,
however, it would have been superfluous to use the words "ample
provision" in Article IX, section 1.
The Washington State Constitution couples the State's para-
mount duty with the words "ample provision." Thus, all children, re-
gardless of whether they are incarcerated, have a constitutional right to
be amply provided with an education. The question then becomes
whether the State's constitutional duty to provide educational services
runs to persons up to age twenty-one (or twenty-two with regard to
children with special education needs).
Despite the clear language of Article IX, and the Seattle School
District court's recognition that all children shall be provided an edu-
cation without distinction or preference, it was necessary for the Tun-
stall court to examine whether the constitutional provision required
the State to provide basic and special education to persons up to age
twenty-one or twenty-two who are incarcerated in DOC prisons. In
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150 et. seq.
84. Seattle School Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 494, 585 P.2d at 82.
85. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 223, 5 P.3d at 703.
86. Id. at 215-216, 5 P.3d at 699.
87. Seattle School Dist, 90 Wash. 2d at 476, 585 P.2d at 85.
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doing so, the court took on the task of defining the term "children" for
purposes of Article IX. 8
The court held "children" under Article IX includes individuals
up to age eighteen, including those children incarcerated in adult
DOC facilities. 89 While the trial court relied on the Basic Education
Act's definition of children,9" the Washington State Supreme Court
found that the Basic Education Act did not actually define or even use
the term "children."91  Rather, the Legislature merely identified the
age group to which the statute applies.92 The court further held that,
although the Basic Education Act complies with Article IX, the Act
does not declare that education for individuals at age twenty-one or
twenty-two is constitutionally required.93 The court reasoned that the
Legislature found that RCW chapter 28A.193 satisfied its constitu-
tional duty under Article IX, by providing for the education of DOC
inmates up to age eighteen, and not up to age twenty-one. 94 The court
presumed that if the Legislature actually intended to create a constitu-
tional definition of "children" in the Basic Education Act, it would
have been constrained by that definition when it enacted chapter
RCW chapter 28A.193.95 Ultimately, the court recognized that even
if the Legislature had intended to extend the definition of "children"
under Article IX to include persons up to age twenty-one, this defini-
tion would not be controlling because the court had the "ultimate
power to interpret, construe, and enforce the Constitution of [the]
State." 96  The court exercised this power by settling on the age of
eighteen as the upper limit for the purposes of defining the term"child."
Although the court was correct in noting that it was its duty to
interpret the meaning of the term "child" under Article IX, the Legis-
lature's definition under the Basic Education Act should have con-
trolled. Notwithstanding that the common understanding of the term
"children" includes only those individuals up to age eighteen, the con-
stitutional limit the court placed on the definition in the context of the
88. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 216-217, 5 P.3d at 699-700.
89. Id.
90. "Each school district's kindergarten through twelve grade educational program shall be
accessible to all students who are five year of age... and less than twenty-one years of age."
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.220(3).
91. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 218, 5 P.3d at 700.
92. Id. at 217, 5 P.3d at 700.
93. Id. at 216, 5 P.3d at 700.
94. Id. at 217, 5 P.3d at 700; WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.193.030(3)-(4) (2003); WASH.
REV. CODE § 72.09.460(2) (2003).
95. Id. at 218; State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash. 2d 730, 736, 539 P.2d 86, 96 (1975).
96. Tunstal, 141 Wash. 2d at 218, 5 P.3d at 700.
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constitutional right to an education is entirely unsound. Because the
court in Seattle School District recognized the right to education under
a "common school system" as fundamental,97 that right properly ap-
plies to all individuals under twenty-one years of age, consistent with
the requirements of the Basic Education Act.98
VI. THE EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR JUVENILE INMATES
LEGISLATION VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
All children should have the same constitutional right to a high
school education, regardless of their criminal past. Despite this
proposition, the Tunstall Court held that the State is not obligated to
provide an identical education to all children within the state regard-
less of the circumstances in which they are found.99 While the State
may not be obligated to provide an identical education to all children,
by placing correctional institution programs on an entirely different
plane than public education programs, an incarcerated youth's funda-
mental right to education is thereby threatened.
It is well settled that a legislative restraint imposed on a
fundamental right is presumed to be unconstitutional. 100  Since
education is a fundamental right under the State Constitution, the
unconstitutionality of RCW chapter 28A. 193 must be presumed.
Article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution provides:
No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens
or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citi-
zens, or corporations.
Article I, section 12, the State's version of the equal protection
clause, has been construed in a manner similar to that of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such construction,
however, is not automatically compelled. Article I, section 12 may be
construed to provide greater protection to individual rights than that
provided by the federal equal protection clause. 1 ' Article I, section 12
requires that "persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate
purpose of the law be similarly treated.' '0 2
97. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 475, 585 P.2d at 71.
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.220 (2003).
99. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 219, 5 P.3d at 700-701.
100. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980) (if a law "impinges upon a funda-
mental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution ... strict scrutiny is re-
quired").
101. See Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 868, 540 P.2d 882, 888 (1975).
102. See State v. Shawn P., 122 Wash. 2d 553, 560, 859 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1993).
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Chapter 28A.193 singles out school-aged youth in prison for
treatment that is different and less favorable than that accorded all
other school-aged youth in the state, including (1) incarcerated school-
aged youth, and (2) school-aged youth incarcerated in juvenile facili-
ties.0 3 This discriminatory legislation violates the equal protection
clause of the Washington Constitution, impinging on the inmates'
paramount right to education.
When a law is challenged as violative of the equal protection
clause, the first step is to determine the level of scrutiny to which the
law must be subjected. Under the rational basis test, the law must rest
upon a legitimate state objective and must not be wholly irrelevant to
achieving that objective."' However, when a statutory classification
affects a suspect class or a fundamental right, it must be subject to
strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.105
The constitutional right to education is more than fundamental;
it is absolute. In Seattle School District, the court held that the consti-
tutional right to education cannot be impaired by legislative action, no
matter how compelling the state interest in doing so.'0 6 Even if the
right to education were only fundamental rather than absolute, RCW
chapter 28A. 193 would still be subject to strict scrutiny.
The Tunstall court dismissed this argument, finding RCW chap-
ter 28A.193 did not infringe upon an inmate's fundamental right to
education under the Washington Constitution. 10 7
The court held absent a fundamental right or involvement of a
suspect class, rational basis review applied. 8 Applying the rational
basis standard, the court found the Legislature's decision to treat indi-
viduals under age eighteen in prison differently with respect to educa-
tion from individuals under age eighteen who are in the normal school
system completely justified. 9  Because incarcerated and non-
incarcerated youths were not similarly situated for the purpose of edu-
cation, the court held the state's provision of education under chapter
103. Students in Washington between the ages of five and twenty-one who are not incar-
cerated in a prison operated by the DOC are eligible to participate in a school program that in-
cludes the basic education program requirements that can lead to the attainment of a high school
diploma. Disabled children and youth in Washington between the ages of five and twenty-two
who are not incarcerated in a prison operated by the DOC are eligible to receive special educa-
tion and related services if they otherwise qualify for those services.
104. See State v. Ward, 123 Wash. 2d 488, 516, 869 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1994).
105. Id.
106. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 513, 585 P.2d at 92-93.
107. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 226, 5 P.3d at 704-705.
108. Id. at 226-227, 5 P.3d at 704-705.
109. Id. at 228, 5 P.3d at 708.
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28A.193 was rationally related to the legitimate state objective of
meeting the unique education needs of inmates.10
Courts of several other states, however, have concluded that
based on their state constitutions, education is a fundamental right,
and therefore any discrimination that implicates the right to education
is subject to strict scrutiny."' In each of these cases, the court struck
down the discriminatory educational regime before it as violating the
state constitution's equal protection guarantee.'' 2
The State of Washington does not have a compelling interest in
discriminating against eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old juvenile in-
mates. The court in Tunstall did not show that denying education to
juvenile offenders over eighteen is necessary "to provide for the opera-
tion of education programs for the department of corrections' juvenile
inmates. '""' Because equal protection requires that classification sys-
tems treat like people alike, all Washington citizens, whether incarcer-
ated or not, have a right to work toward a high school diploma until
they are twenty-one or twenty-two years old. Incarcerated Washing-
ton residents are, however, wrongfully denied this opportunity.
Implicit in the right to education is the view that appropriate
education is a critical component of rehabilitation. For this reason, the
denial of educational opportunities to children who are incarcerated
undermines one of the primary purposes of the treatment of juveniles
in the justice system. Those incarcerated youths, who normally would
have until age twenty-one or twenty-two to earn a high school di-
ploma, now only have the opportunity until age eighteen. Denying
individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two their funda-
mental right to both basic and special education undermines the
criminal justice system's goal of rehabilitation and deprives these indi-
viduals of the basic skills necessary to become productive members of
society.
VII. JUVENILE INMATES' RIGHT TO SPECIAL EDUCATION
It is undisputed that a substantial number of children in the ju-
venile delinquency system are children with education-related disabili-
110. Id. at 227, 5 P.3d at 705 ("[I]ncarcerated children may have different educational
needs and may require different training programs more appropriate to their circumstances.").
111. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107, 159, 161 (Ala. 1993); Washakie Co.
School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 335 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824
(1980); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 952-953, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (Cal. 1977); Horton
v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977).
112. Id.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.193.005 (2003).
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ties."' Poor educational performance among children in the delin-
quency system is, in significant part, a function of the high percentage
of children in that system who have education-related disabilities and
who have not received the benefit of appropriate, effective special edu-
cation services."' People in positions of authority who make decisions
that affect the categorization and treatment of children in the delin-
quency system are typically not sufficiently aware of the existence and
nature of education-related disabilities." 6 In the same way, these offi-
cials are not aware of their legal obligations to identify and accommo-
date children with disabilities. Thus, government officials in the de-
linquency system fail to develop policies and programs aimed at
identifying and serving children with disabilities.
Consistent with the trend of failing to accommodate children
with disabilities in the juvenile delinquency system, the court in Tun-
stall neglected to address the class of inmates' state constitutional right
to special education, and further held that neither the state Special
Education Act".7 nor the federal Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act ("IDEA")" 8 required the State to provide special education
services to persons over age eighteen who are incarcerated in adult
prisons.
A. Washington's Special Education Act
The law unequivocally requires that all disabled students be pro-
vided a free, appropriate education in the least restrictive environ-
ment-even when the student is incarcerated." 9 Like the Basic Edu-
cation Act, Washington's Special Education Act similarly applies to
youths incarcerated in DOC facilities. 2 The Special Education Act's
purpose is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have the oppor-
tunity for an appropriate education 2' at public expense as guaranteed
114. See, e.g., Patricia Puritz and Mary An Scali, Beyond the Walls: Improving Conditions
of Confinement for Youth in Custody, OJJDP REPORT, 16-17 (January 1998) (citing, inter alia, a
meta-analysis conducted by Pamela Casey and Ingo Keilitz demonstrating that 35.6 percent ju-
venile offenders have learning disabilities).
115. Joseph B. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Identify, Accommodate,
and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Leads to Their Disproportionate Representation
In the Delinquency System, at http://www.edj.org/Publications/RXessayl-00.pdf (last visited
May 11, 2003).
116. Id.
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.020 (2003).
118. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1436 (2003).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.020 (2003).
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.
121. "Appropriate education" is defined as "an education directed to the unique needs,
abilities, and limitations of the children with disabilities." WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.020
(2003).
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to them by the Constitution of this state. , 122 "Children with disabili-
ties" includes individuals between the ages of three and twenty-two
who are:
In school or out of school who are temporarily or permanently re-
tarded in normal educational processes by reason of physical or
mental disability, or by reason of emotional maladjustment, or
by reason of other disability, and those children who have spe-
cific learning and language disabilities resulting from percep-
tual-motor disabilities, including problems in visual and audi-
tory perception and integration. 123
The Tunstall court reasoned that because the Special Education
Act did not specifically include youths incarcerated in DOC facilities,
the statute consequently excluded the group.124 The court referenced
the Act's section titled "Superintendent of public instruction's duty
and authority," which states the superintendent is required to "prom-
ulgate such rules as are necessary to implement the several provisions
of the [basic and special education acts] and to ensure educational op-
portunities within the common school system for all children with dis-
abilities who are not institutionalized.' 12' The court reasoned that the
superintendent is not responsible for ensuring educational opportuni-
ties to inmates, and individuals incarcerated in DOC facilities are not
covered under the Basic Education Act. Thus, the court concluded
the class of inmates is outside "the common school system" and not
covered under the act.126 The court justified its conclusion based upon
the Special Education Act's silence regarding DOC inmates. 127 How-
ever, it is plausible to conclude that had the Legislature intended to
specifically exempt inmates with disabilities from being covered by the
Act, the exemption would have been made explicit. The court's con-
clusion was ill-reasoned and inconsistent both with the clear language
of the Act and with Article IX of the State Constitution. Under the
Special Education Act, is it clear all disabled youths between three-
and twenty-one years old are entitled to special education services, and
the law makes no exception for youths in adult prisons. 12
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.010 (2003) emphasis added).
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.020 (2003).
124. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 215, 5 P.3d at 699.
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.090(7) (2003) (emphasis added).
126. Tunstall, 141 Wash. 2d at 215, 5 P.3d at 699.
127. Id. at 216, 5 P.3d at 699.
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.020 (2003).
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B. The Federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"),
passed by Congress under the auspices of its spending power, man-
dates that states receiving federal support for education of students
with disabilities ensure that all eligible students receive a free appro-
priate public education (FAPE) 29 Specifically, the IDEA requires
that public schools and state-operated correctional facilities provide
each eligible child with a FAPE in the least restrictive environment. 130
The IDEA requires that states identify, locate, and evaluate all chil-
dren with disabilities residing in the state who need special education
and related services. Education agencies are responsible for conduct-
ing a full, individual evaluation to determine whether a child is eligible
for services under the IDEA and to determine the needs of the child.
Imprisoned youth with disabilities are entitled to seven basic ser-
vices under the IDEA: (1) screening, identification, and referral; (2)
comprehensive evaluation or assessment to determine the nature and
extent of the disability and what special services are needed; (3) devel-
opment of an individualized education program (IEP), including a
specific written plan for services, how they will be provided, goals and
immediate objectives and specific means to accomplish those goals; (4)
special individually tailored educational services for each student in
the least restrictive setting possible within the institution; (5) related
services necessary to assist a student to benefit from special education
(such as psychological counseling or speech therapy); (6) procedural
protections; and (7) transition planning to prepare for transition from
correction institution to school, work, family or independent living.1 31
It is well established that a State's obligation under the IDEA to
provide a FAPE to "all children with disabilities residing in the State
between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive," extends to youth in correc-
tional facilities. In the landmark case Green v. Johnson, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court of Massachusetts ruled that students with disabilities do
not forfeit their rights to an appropriate education because of incar-
129. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415, the Education for All Handicapped Children's Act, was
passed in 1975 and went into effect in 1977. Among other things, and as a condition of receiving
federal funds, states guarantee that all children with disabilities will receive a free appropriate
public education in the least restrictive environment. Additionally, IDEA provides a number of
procedural rights to parents and requires that schools use nondiscriminatory procedures to assess
children suspected of having a disability. For a detailed discussion of the original law and the
forces that precipitated its passage, see LEVINE & WEXLER, PL 94-142: AN ACT OF
CONGRESS (1981).
130. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2003).
131. Osa D. Coffey, Ph.D, Handicapped Youth and Young Adults in Prison: Forgotten Cli-
ents in Search of Assistance, in SEVERE BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 99-
100 (Robert B. Rutherford and John W. Maag, eds. 1998).
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ceration.132 Furthermore, in Donnell v. Illinois, the federal court al-
lowed the plaintiffs to maintain a cause of action under the IDEA
where twenty-three school-aged detainees alleged they had been de-
nied complete access to regular and special educational services during
their period of pretrial detention. 3 ' The court found the Department
of Education intended the Act to apply to state correctional facilities,
pursuant to 34 C.F.R. section 300.2(b)(4). 34 Similarly, in Christina A.
v. Bloomberg, a federal district court in South Dakota certified a class
of plaintiffs under the age of twenty-one to pursue their claim of dep-
rivation of special education and related services to which they were
entitled under the IDEA while confined in a juvenile correction facil-
ity. 35 These court decisions, among others, ensure that students with
disabilities will receive a FAPE, and these assurances clearly extend to
students in correctional facilities.
Implementation of the IDEA in state correctional facilities can be
challenging given the Act's 1997 amendments, which limited a state's
obligation somewhat in providing special education in correctional fa-
cilities. The IDEA amendments of 1997 revised the eligibility provi-
sions so that states may choose not to provide special education ser-
vices to youths with disabilities, ages eighteen to twenty-one, who, in
the educational placement prior to their incarceration in an adult
correctional facility: (a) were not actually identified as being a child
with a disability under the IDEA or (b) did not have an individualized
education program (TEP) under the IDEA. 36 Washington law,
however, requires that special education be provided to "all children
with disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one." '137 Thus,
since State law does require that youth eighteen to twenty-one in adult
correctional facilities be provided with special education services
132. See Green v. Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965 (D. Mass. 1981) (granting preliminary
injunction directing that special education be provided to all prisoners under age twenty-two); see
also 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(iv) (2003) (stating that the IDEA applies to "state correctional facili-
ties).
133. 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
134. Id.
135. 197 F.R.D. 664 (D. S.D. 2000).
136. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1436 (2003); The IDEA as amended in 1997 provides: The obliga-
tion to make a free appropriate education available to all children with disabilities does not apply
with respect to children:
(ii) aged 18 through 21 to the extent that state law does not require that special educa-
tion and related services under this [subchapter] be provided to children with disabili-
ties who, in the educational placement prior to their incarceration in an adult correc-
tional facility: (I) were not actually identified as being a child with a disability under
section 1401(3) of this title; or (II) did not have an individualized education program
under this [subchapterl.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2003).
137. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.155.020 (2003) (emphasis added).
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(under the Special Education Act set forth above), the exception under
the 1997 amendments does not and should not apply in Washington.
This is true notwithstanding RCW chapter 28A.193 because that
statute does not amend the Special Education Act or deal with special
education in prison in any way.
Under the IDEA, the Office of the Superintendent of Public In-
struction ("OSPI") has the ultimate duty to ensure that disabled
youths in prison receive special education. The OSPI is ultimately re-
sponsible for ensuring that:
(i) the requirements of [IDEA] are met; and
(ii) all educational programs for children with disabilities in the
State, including all such programs administered by any other State
or local agency-
(I) are under the general supervision of individuals in the State
who are responsible for educational programs for children with
disabilities; and
(II) meet the educational standards of the State educational
agency. 138
These regulations make it clear that the reference to 'all pro-
grams' includes state correctional facilities and that the requirements
of the IDEA apply to such facilities. 139
VIII. CONCLUSION
The failure of Washington State to provide educational programs
to youth in correctional facilities that are equivalent to those provided
to all other youth within the State is both unconstitutional and unwise.
A great majority of these youth will return to society, and most of
them will not return to any kind of formal educational setting. The
difficulties associated with providing both basic and special educa-
tional services to these youths are intertwined with the current politi-
cal climate-where rehabilitation is often cited as a primary purpose in
juvenile corrections, but punishment and retribution seem to be
higher priorities. Typically, education services for young people both
with and without disabilities are a low priority for many correctional
administrators. To provide education services for young people, cor-
rections programs must meet the state constitutional duty to provide
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(A) (2003) (emphasis added); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.600
(2003).
139. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 800 (D. S.C. 1995).
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all children ample provision for education. Ultimately, improving the
access to, and quality of, educational services for young people re-
quires involvement from state and local administrators of correctional
facilities and programs, advocates for children, and correctional educa-
tors. In light of Tunstall's erroneous holding, the first and most criti-
cal step is to urge the Washington State Legislature to amend the
Education Program for Juvenile Inmates statute so as to provide a
right to both basic and special education to juvenile inmates up to the
age of twenty-one.
